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Two-step  selection  methods  are applied  to the 1983  Survey  of Consumer  Finances  to exarnine  both the
extent  to which bonowing constraints  restrict household  acc€ss  to debt and  the manner  in which lenders
vary debt limits  across borrowers.  Results indicate that 30 percent of  young families are credit
constrained,  and  that roughly half of these  families would hold at least  $12,000  (1982  dollan) more  debt
if borrowing eonstraints  were relaxed. Debt limits increase  with householil  income  and  wealth, but are
relaxed  for families with a good  credit history.  In addition, even  after controlling for household  income,
wealth, credit history, and  many other variables,  minorities face  tighter debt limits and are more likely
to be credit constrained  than white families.
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This study addresses  two distinct but related  questions:  to what extent  do borrowing constraints
affect the level of debt held by households,  ard how do lenders  vary debt ceilings across  prospective
borrowers, especially  with regard  to race?r While the former question  has  been  studied  primarily in the
academic  literature by analysts  interested  in testing the perfect capital markets  assumptions  of the Life-
Cycle/Permanent  Income Hypothesis  (LCPIH), the latter question  has sparked  a heated  debate  in the
public press  and among  various branches  of government. Under these  conditions, the implications of
borrowing constraints  for the LCPIH and the possibility of racial discrimination in loan markets  have
been  analyzed  in isolation  from one  another. In fact, however,  the two questions  are  linked since  binding
borrowing contraints  affect household  behavior  regardless  of the motivation for those  constraints.
Given that this paper has implications  both for studies  on the validity of the LCPIH as well as
studies on racial discrimination in  credit markets, guidance  for  our work can be taken from  both
literatures. On the one  hand, important research  testing  the robustness  of the IfPIH  includes  a number
of cross-section  and  panel  data  analyses,  such  as  those  by Hall and  Mishkin  (1982),  Hayashi  (1985),  and
Zeldes (1989).  These papers  provide evidence  that the time path of consumption  expenditures  for
households  that are not credit constrained  differs ftom that of families for whom borrowing constrahts
nwy be binding.  Based  on those  findings the authors  typically conclude  that borrowing constraints  have
an important  impact  on a subset  of the population. A limitation of these  studies,  however,  is that the  data
used  do not directly identiry credit constrained  and unconstrained  families.z This has raised  questions
about  whether  the analyses  above  suffer from coding  errors  when  splitting the sample  on the basis  ofwho
is not credit constrained.
On the other hand, the Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances  (SCF) allows the
researcher  to directly identify families that have  recently  been  turned down for credit, received  smaller-
thandesired loans, or have been  dissuaded  from applying for credit.  Using the SCF, Jappelli (1990)
investigated  the characteristiqs  of  credit constrained  families, and Cox and Jappelli (forthcoming)
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These  two studies,  however,  did not control for a number  of variables  used  by lenders  in evaluating  loan
applications,  including credit history in the case  of lappelli (1990)  and  both credit history and wealth in
the case  of Cox and Jappelli (forthcoming).3
The importance  of controlling for wealth  and  credit history when  analyzing  household  access  to
credit has  been  underscored  by recent  debate  about  whether  racid discrimination  restricts  tlre ability of
minority households  to obtain credit.  Although that controversy  dates  back at least  to the 1970s  when
a wave of Fair knding  legislation  was enacted,  the debate  has become  especially  sharp in the last few
years with  the release  of  199O  mortgage  application data that were collected as palt  of the Home
Mortgage  Disclosure  Act (HMDA).4  An initial Federal  Reserve  report based  on those  data  fudicated  that
in 1990,  modgage  applicatiors from black households  across  the United States  were  denied  at a rate  2.4
times higher than applications  from white households  with similar income [Canner  and Smith (1991)].
As noted  by Rehm  (1991b),  that nnding  prompted  House  Banking  Committee  Ch4irman  Henry Gorzalez
to ask "...  top regulators  for an 'immediate' report on what their agencies  plan to do 'to correct the
lending problems  revealed  [by the HMDA data].'  However, the HMDA data  do not include  household
credit history or wealth, in addition to other important  variables  that appear  on loan application  forms.
As a result, many other individuals in government,  the banking  industry, and  academia  have  questioned
whether  the HMDA  data imply that lenders  discrirninate  against  minority loan applicants.5
Partly in response  to that debate,  the Boston Federal Reserve  Bank has conducted  a study of
mortgage  application  denial rates  in Boston [Munnell et. al. (1992)] using a much wider range  of loan
applicant  characteristics  than previously  analyzed. An important  finding of the study is that allowing for
differences in  loan applicant wealth and credit history reduces  but do€s not eliminate race related
differences  in mortgage  denial rates. Although these  results  provide a new perspective  on the Boston
mortgage  market, the study still has  limitations.  In particular, the decision  to apply for a loan is treated
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as exogenous. If  instead  minority applicants  are disproportionately  discouraged  from applyiqg for a
mortgage,  then  the  Boston  study  may  understate  discrimination  effects.6  On the other  hand, if households
are able  to substitute  different forms of debt to offset constraints  on access  to a given type of loan, then
the Boston study could overstate  the effect of discrimination on the ability of minority  households  to
obtain  credit.T
Building off of the various work described  above,  our study addresses  the two questions  posed
at the outset by  drawing on certain special feahrres  of the 1983 SCF, including a wide range of
information on household  credit history and wealth. We restrict our analysis  to a group of households
that are  representative  of families in the United States  with heads  under  age  35, the age  group most likely
to be affected  by borrowing constraints.8 Using these  data a bivariate probit model is first  estimated
based  on who is not credit constrained  and who would like to hold positive debt.  In a second  stage,  a
reduced  form household  debt  demand  function is estimated  using  only unconstrained  households  tlnt hold
positive debt, controlling for selection  effects related to both the decision  to apply for credit and the
absence  of binding borrowing constraints.e  By examining  the total amount  of debt held by households,
we allow for the possibility thar families may be able to substitute  different forms of debt to offset
idiosyncratic  constmints  on access  to a given type of credit. As a result, estimates  from the debt function
enable  us to predict the total level of debt that credit constrained  families would prefer to hold in the
absence  of binding borrowing constraints.  In addition, in a manner  to be clarified later, comparing
coefficients  of the credit model to those of the debt function allows us to characterize  the qualitative
marurer  in which lenders  vary debt ceilings across  households.
Results  indicate  that 30 percent  of young  households  are  credit constrained,  and  that half of tltese
families would hold at least  $12,000  more debt (in 1982  dollars) if borrowing constraints  wete relaxed,
ceteris  paribus.  This suggests  that many young households  may have  a limited ability to smooth  their
consumption,  in contrast  to assurnptions  underlying  the LCPIH.  That finding is consistent  with various
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) studies  that have found evidence  of excess  volatility  in household  consumption  relative to behavior
irplied  by a strict interpretation  of the LCPIH.
Further analysis  indicates  that households  with strong intriruic preferences  fot holding debt are
more likely to be credit constrained,  lenders  set higher debt limits for families with higher levels of
income and wealth, and debt limits are relaxed for families with a good credit history.  Moreover,
minority households  are  significantly  more  likely to be  credit  constrained  than  comparable  white families,
but there  is no discernible  difference  in the demand  for debt  amone  white and  nonwhite  households.  This
pattern  of results  suggests  that racial discrimination  limits minoril  access  to debt,  consistent  with recent
findings in the Boston mortgage  rnarket.
To establish  these  results  the plan for the paper  is as follows.  Section  II presents  our ernpirical
methodology.  Section III  describes  the data, section IV  presents  findings, and section V  provides
concluding  comments.
II.  Econonetric  Model and Estimation Method
Our model is specified by three principal equations. The first  equation is the household's
prefened level of debt (D*)  at current market interest rates.  Because  we use cross-section  data, all
households  in the sample  face  the same  set  of market interest  rates  which are  captured  primarily through
the  constant.ro  Hence,  D* is given  by,
D4:xd  +  eb (l)
where  x are household  characteristics  and  d are  the parameters.  The second  equation  is an unobservable
index that determines  whether  a household  prefers  to hold pocitive  or zero debt  at market interest  rates,rr
I, :  xa  *  u,.  (2)
This equation  controls for the fact that debt holdings are truncated  below by zero.  The third equation
is an unobservable  index that determines  whether  the household  is unaffected  by borrowing constraints
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(i.e., the debt ceiling set by lenders  exceeds  D*) under current market conditions,
lr= zB +  u.  €)
If a household  is credit corstrained or if  it prefers to hold zero debt, then D'  is not observed.
Note also, that if  the demand  function determines  whether  households  hold zero debt, (1) and (2) are
identical which is testable  as will  become  apparent  below.  In addition, given that a household  is credit
constrained  only when it would like to borrow more debt than  lenders  will allow, z should include  all of
the  determirurnts  of the demand  for debt (x) as  well as  any  additional  regressors  that  affect  lender  irnposed
debt limits but which do not affect the demand  for debt itself.
The observable  discrete  analogues  to (2) and (3) are given by,
Dbt0  :  1, I,  >  0  + positive  debt  (4)
0,  Ir < 0 +zerodebt
and  Cr  :  1, 12  )  0  +  not constrained  (5)
0, Ir<0  +  constrained
Note  that credit constrained  families always  prefer  to hold positive  debt, while families that  prefer to hold
zero  debt carmot  be credit constrained. Hence,  Cr is defined  only over households  for whom Dbt0 :  l,
and  there are only three distinct cells in the model, Cr  :  Dbt0 :  1, Cr  :  0 and Dbt0 =  1, and Dbt0
:  O. Estimation  of this model is simplified by assuming  that [e,, u,, ul  is distributed  trivariate normal
with mean  zero and variance  matrix (V),
d  or,ur
v  :  or,ur  I
ot,,a  oul.u2 I
Observe,  also, that the same  model as above  can be used  to estimate  a log-linear debt demand  function
simply by reinterpreting  D* in (l)  as  the log of debt. To simplify exposition,  however,  we focus on the
linear case  here (selected  results  from the log-tormal model are  presented  later in the paper).
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To estimate the model above two step methods  were used as described  by Tunali (1986).r'z
Initially,  a bivariate probit model is estimated  by maximum likelihood to evaluate  the probability that
families are  unconstrained  and  would like to hold positive  debt  (Cr:  DbtO=  1). Following T[nali  (1986),
the log-likelihood function for this model is given by,
t{(l-Dbt0).logtFCxa)l  + Db0Cr.log[G(xa,qg,o,,,J1  (6)
+  Dbt0{l-Cr).logtc(xa,-zg,-o",.Jl},
where F and G are the unit and bivariate standard  normal distribution functions, respectively.
Based  on work by Rosenbaum  (1963),  Tunali  (1986)  shows  that,
E[e,: u, )  - xa,  u?  > -zg]:  r,,,1M1-1  I  o,,urM,,".,  (7)
where M,-,  and M;-  are functions  of xa, zg, and our.,,2.  For the special  case  when ort  equals  zero,
M,.", and  M,.,  both collapse  to the  traditional  Mills ratio I(s) :  fls)/F(s), where  / and  F are  the unit
normal density and distribution functions, and I  is  evaluated  at xd  and zg for  M,,,,  and M',r,
respectively.  More  generally,  however,  when  ou,.,  differs  from  zero  the  expressions  for Mr.ur  and  M1.u2
become  complicated  and  are  not  presented  he(e  to conserve  space.!3  Expressions  for M,,u1  and  M,,* ate
provided  in Appendix  A and  can  also  be  found  in Maddala  (1983,  page  282)  and  Tunali  (1986).
Using estirnates  of a, g, and  o",.* from the bivariate  probit routine, M1.,t  and  M,,u, were formed
for each household. Consistent  estimates  of the debt function parameters  (d) were then obtained  by
including  M,.", and  M,.,  in a second  stage  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  regression  of the  debt  function
(1) using  only unconstrained  households  that hold positive debt. The coeffrcients  on M,.", and  M,,*  also
give  consistent  estimates  of ri,ul, and  o,,u2,  while  further  manipulation  yields  a consistent  estimate  of oi.
Correct aslmptotic standard  errors are obtained  based  on formulae described  by Maddala (1984) and
extentions  developed  by Tunali  (1986)-14
To clarify how these  estimates  enable  us to evaluate  the impact of borrowing constraints  on
household  debt, we should  emphasize  that D* [expression  (1)] is the pteferred  level of debt at prevailing
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could influence the observed  level of wealth held by a family.tE Accordingly, to control for possible
simultaneity  effects  net wealth  is regressed  on all of the exogenous  variables  in the model  as  well as  some
addition4l variables taken from the SCF.  The fitted value from the wealth equation  (]VHat) was then
included  in the demand  function and  the discrete  choice  models. Results  from the wealth regression  are
provided in Appendix C.
Total household  income in $100,000  units (INC82) and INC82 squared  (INCSQ82) were also
included  in the  debt equrtions,  as  was  the  unemployment  rate  in 1982  for the household  head's  profession
(UNEMP).  Higher income  families likely have  an  increased  demand  for debt  given  their elevated  demand
for consumer  durables like housing.  Also, to the extent that a household's  future income is secure,
presumably the family  would be more willing  to borrow against future income to smooth current
consumption  which would increase  the demand  for debt.
Theory also suggests  that households  that expect  to receive  pension  benefrts  will  hold more debt
today. To control for such  effects,  income  is interacted  with a dummy  variable  that equals  1 if either the
household  head  or spouse  exp€ct  to receive  pension  income,  and  zero otherwise. The resulting variable
(PENINC) proxies expected  future pension  income  and is expected  to have  a positive sign.
Preferences  for holding debt  are  further proxied based  on whether  households  felt it was "all right
for someone  like [the respondent]  to borrow money  to ... finance  medical  expenses  or to finance  living
expenses  when income  is cut (EMERG); to finance  auto or fumiture purchases  (DUR); to finance  luxury
items  (LUX);te  to finance  a vacation  (CONSUMP),'  and  whether  a household  would  not  be '...  willing
to take any ffirancial risks ... when [saving or making] investments  (AVERSE).  "  PresunEbly,  people
who feel it is all right to borrow will hold more  debt. On the other  hand,  fumilies that are relatively risk
averse  may be less inclined to lever up in the housing market and would, therefore, hold less debt.
Finally, preferenccs  for holding debt were also  proxied by traditional demographic  vatiables, including
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the household  head's  marital status  (MARR), sex (SEX), education  (ED), and race (RACE), as well as
household  size (HSIZE).
All of the variables  above  are included  in the  probit model  of who is not credit constrained  since
the demand  for debt affects  the extent  to which families bump into lender inposed debt ceilings.  Also
included  in the credit constraint  model are additional  variables  frequently  requested  on loan application
forms.  These variables include the number of years the household  head has worked at lhe current
employer  (CUREMP), whether  the household  has  a checking  account  (CHECK), whether  the household
has received  public assistance  0VELFARE), and whether  the household  has  had problems  making loan
payments  in the past  thre€ years  (BADHST).  In addition, a household  was  defined as having a history
of homeownership  if  it purchased  or inherited their cunent home (as of the survey date)  prior to 1980
(OWNHISD.'0  Similarly, a household  was  defined  as  having  a credit history odrer  than homeownershiP
if  it  had a nonrnortgage  loan still  outstanding  that was originated prior to 1980 (SOMHST).  These
variables in  conjunction with  the household's  demographic  and financial characteristics  control for
essentially  all of the information requested  on most loan application  forms.2r
IV.  Results
Summary statistics for the sample  are in Table I.  Observe  that nearly 30 percent of young
households  in 1983  perceived  themselves  as  credit constrained  (Cr = 0).  Moreover, nonwhites  account
for 27.4 percent  of credit constrained  families but only 14.0 percent  of unconstrained  families.  These
data  suggest  that many young households  are credit constrained,  and that nonwhite  households  account
for a disproportionate  share  of such  families.
Model I  in Table II  presents  estimates  from the bivariate probit model of who is not credit
constrained  (Cr  :  l)  based  on the likelihood function in expression  (6)."  As discussed  earlier, by
atlowing r,1,,,,  to differ from zero, equrtion (6) controls  for possible  selection  effects  stemmilg from the
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fact that Cr  is defined only for individuals that want to hold positive debt (Dbt0 :  l).  In practice,
however,  observe  that our estimate  of d"r..2  is small  and  insignificant  which suggests  that selection  effects
in the discrete  choice  model are not an issue  for our sample. In addition, an estimate  of ou1-2  close  to
zero indicates  that households  with an unexpectedly  high propensity  to desire  positive debt (relative to
xa) are  no more likely to be credit constrained  &an families with average  preferences  for holding positive
debt.  As shown  later, however, that result does  not necessarily  irnply that the demand  for debt has no
impact on the propensity  to be credit constrained.r
In reviewing the variable coefficients in Table II,  recall that the likelihood that a prospective
borrower is credit constrained  is positively related  to the demand  for debt but is negatively  related  to the
debt  ceiling imposed  by lenders. Hence,  lhe sign of a variable  in the credit constraint  model d@ends  on
theeffectofthatvariableonD'relativetothevariable'seffectonlenderimposeddebtceilings.  Bearing
that thought in mind, observe  that households  are more likely to face binding borrowing constraints  if
they  have  a bad  credit  history  (BADHST  = 1)  or no credit  history  (OWNHIST:0), if they  do not have
a checking  account  (CHECK=O), or if the family has  recently  been  on welfare (|VELFARE = 1).4  The
variables  SOMHST and  C{JREMP also  have  the anticipated  signs,  but are insignificant. Assuming  that
credit history does  not directly affect  the demand  for debt, these  results  confirm that lenders  tighten debt
limits on borrowers with limited or bad credit histories.
Another striking result in column (2) is that wealth, income,  and income  security (as  proxied by
UNEMP) do not have  a statistically  significant  effect  on the  probability of being  credit constrained.s But
this result is at least partially explained  by examining  results  from the debt demand  functions in Table
IIL  Observe  that for various specifications  of the demand  function, wealth and income  generally have
a positive and  significant  effect  on the demand  for debt, while the coefficient  on UNEMP is negative  and
significant.  Accordingly, it appears  that the amount  of debt that lenders  are willing to extend  increases
with borrower income  and wealth, as well as with job and income  security.
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Marital status  (1 if manied) has  a positive and  significant  coefncient  in the  credit consftaht model
(in Table II),  and a small and insignificant effect on the demand  for  debt.  Hence, it  appears  that
borrowing limits are less  stringent  for married families, ceteris  paribus.m Household  size (HSIZE) and
a willingness to borrow for luxury (LuX)  items  have  negative  and marginally significant effects on the
propensity  to obtain the desired  level of credit.  In contrast,  these  vadables  have  positive effects  on the
demand  for credit.  Given the combination  of estimated  effects  on HSIZE, it is not possible  to determine
the direction of effect (if any) of HSIZE on lender imposed  borrowing constraints. On the other hand,
recall that LUX  pertains  to whether  households  felt it was "all right"  for someone  like themselves  to
borrow to finance  the purchase  of luxury items, Given the subjective  nature  of LUX,  presumably  such
preference  related  information does  not influence  lender  decisions. Accordingly, the negative  coefficient
on LUX  in the credit constraint  model further suggests  that families with a higher intrinsic demand  for
debt are more likely to be credit constrained.
To evaluate  the effect  of RACE (  1 if nonwhite)  on access  to credit, first compare  results  in Model
I of Table II to the more parsimonious  specification  in Model tr that omits WHat and  the credit history
variables.2T  Observe  that failing to control for wealth  and  credit history biases  upwards  the significance
and estimated  coefficient on RACE.  This finding supports  arguments  that 1990  HMDA  data overstate
the effect of race on mo(gage rejection rates  because  those  data do not control for wealth and credit
history [e.g., Rehm  (1991a)]. Nevertheless,  RACE still has  a negative  and  significant  coefficient  in
Model I.  In addition, RACE has  a generally  negative  (but marginally significant) effect on the demand
for debt in Table IIL  Hence,  it appears  that lenders  set  tighter credit limits for nonwhite  families, even
after controlling for credit history, wealth, income, and  the other regressors.4
We should emphasize  that the results above  are robust  to alternative  specifications  of the debt
demand  function. For example,  observe  that the sign  and  significance  of the demand  function coefficients
are similar  for  the linear  and log-linear selection models in  columns (1)  and (3)  of  Table IV,
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) _tJ
respectively.2e  The only exception  is that neither selection  temF, Mr,u1  or M1.u2,  ate significant in the
tinear case,  but Mr.,, has  a negative  and  significant  coeffrcient  in the log-linear model.s  Note, also, that
coefficients  ftom lhe linear selection  model  are  not statistically  different from estinates  based  on the OLS
model  in column  (2) even  though  the  OLS model  omits  Mr.o1  and  M1-.3r
The Impact and Inciclence  of Borrowing Constraints
Two methods  were used  to evaluate  whether  borrowing constraints  affect household  behavior.
First, columns  (1) through (3) of Table  IV present  results  ftom Tobit models  of the debt  dermnd function
based  on families that are not credit constrained.  families that are credit constrained,  and  the full sample
of both constrained  and unconstrained  families, respectively. If  borrowing constraints  do not affect
household  debt, coefficients  from the three  models  should  be similar. To test  that hypothesis  a likelihood
ratio test was  constructed  based  on the logJikelihood from the full sample  model and  the sum of the log-
likelihoods from the stratified models.32  The resulting test statistic  equals  79.1 which overwhelmingly
rejects the hypothesis  of a unified sample in favor of the stratified models.  Hence, it  appears  that
borrowing constraints  have  a significant  effect on the behavior  of some  households,  at least  with respect
to the demand  for debt.
As discussed  earlier, the difference between  the actual and preferred levels of debt held by
constrained  families can  be predicted  using expression  (10). Such  estimates  are  presented  in Table V for
each  of the models in Table III.33 Observe  that the estimated  median  impact based  on the selectivity-
adjusted  linear demand  function is small relative to the other  models,  but this result should  probably be
discounted  given the insignificant  selectivity  terms  upon  which the estimate  is based. In addition, the log-
liner model was sensitive  to outliers when predicting D*  for constrained  families, causing  us to view
resulrs  from that modei with caution.a In contrast.  the Ol,S model  and  the Tobit models  did not appe€r
to be sensitive  to outliers.  Given the lack of selectivity  effects  in the linear case,  we are inclined to focus
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on the OLS or Tobit models  as  providing our preferred  estfunates  of the impact  of borrowing constraints.
In those  cases,  50 percent  of the credit constrained  households  would hold at least  $12,000  (1982  dollan)
more debt if borrowing constraints  had been rclaxed,  ceteis paibus,3s
Table VI  presents  several  simulations that enable  us to evaluate  the effect of race ard credit
history on the ftequency  of credit constrained  households.  For each  simulation  we calculate  the expected
proportion of credit constrained  households  based  on the sample  mean  of dre  probability of being credit
constrained,  [1 - G(xa,zg,o.,,J - F(xa)],  where  G(') is the probability  that  a family prefers  to hold
positive debr  and is not credit constrained,  F(.) is the probability that a family prefers  to hold zero debt,
and  the remaining  notation is defined  as  in Section  II.  To simulate  a good  credit history, BADHST and
WELFARE were set equal to 0 and OWNHIST, SOMHST, and CHECK were set equal to I  when
forming zg, while opposite  values  were used  to simulate  a bad credit history.  By setting  RACE equal
to either 0 or I when forming xa and  zg, a given set  of households  was  effectively turned into all White
or all Nonwhite families, respectively. In all cases  the remaining  variables  in x and z were set equal  to
the actual  values  for each  household. Also, each  simulation  was  conducted  separately  for the White and
Nonwhite  families  in our sample.
Observe  that the actual frequency of credit constrained  families among Nonwhite and White
households  is 46.4 percent and  27  -3 percent,  respectively,  a difference  of roughly 19  percentage  points.
However,  if the  Nonwhite  sample  had  otherwise  been  White,  ceteris  paribus,  37.5  percent  of the  sample
would have  been  credit constrained,  a difference  of roughly 10  percentage  points from the White sarnple.
That l0 point gap can be attributed to racial differences  in danographic, financial, and credit history
characteristics. On the other hand, loan applicant race  accounts  for the remaining 9 percentage  points
of the observed  racial difference  in the probability of being credit constrained.36
Further examination  of Table VI  also provides insight into the importance  of credit history
relative to loan applicant  race  when  applying for a loan. Using the white sample,  for example,  note that
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regardless  of whether  the simulated  race is white or nonwhite,  a bad simulated  credit history increases
the ftequency  of credit constrained  families by roughly 40 percentage  points relative  to a Sood  simulated
credit history.  Moreover, a similar result holds if we use  the nonwhite  sample. Hence,  the probability
of being credit constrained  is roughly 4-112  times more  sensitive  to a loan applicant's  credit history than
to the loan applicant's  race.
VI.  Conclusions
Using a unique  set  of variables  in the 1983  Survey  of Consumer  Finances  (SCF), this study  finds
that 30 percent  of households  under age  35 in the early 1980s  would like to hold more debt than lenders
will allorv,  and  tbat  roughly  half of these  families  would  hold  at least  $12,000  (1982  dollars)  more  debt
if borrowing constraints  were relaxed,  ceteris  paribus. These  findings provide one  explanation  for why
empirical studies frequently find  evidence that  consumer spending and behavior do  not  display
characteristics  that are consistent  with a strict interpretation  of the Life Cycle Hypothesis.
Results  also indicate tlnt  households  with intrinsically strong preferences  for holding debt are
more likely to be constrained  by a given set of debt lirnits.  In addition, families with low income, little
wealth, a limited credit history, or a bad credit history face  tighter debt limits, consistent  with various
theoretical  models  of credit  availability  [e.g. Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989,  1990),  Jaffee  and Russell
(1976),  and  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981,  1983)1.
We also find  that controlling for  household  wealth ard credit history reduces  but does not
eliminate evidence that minority  borrowers face tighter  credit constraints than comparable white
households.  That result is consistent  with findings from a recerf Boston  Federal  Reserve  Bank  study  that
examined  race related  differences  in mortgage  loan denial rates  in Boston. To put our race results in
perspective,  however, we should  emphasize  ttrat additional  simulations  suggest  that the probability that
a given bonower is credit constrained  is roughly 4-ll2  times  more sensitive  to the loan applicant's  credit
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history  than  to the  loan  applicant's  race. Hence,  although  race  has  a significant  effect  on  access  to credit,
the  impact  of race  on  access  to debt  appears  to be  small  relative  to borrower  credit  history  characteristics.
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ll.Roughly  29% of eonstrained  families and 16%  ofunconstrained  families in the sample  hold zero  debt.
l2.Tunali (1986) clarifies many  of the technical  issues  underlying  estimation  of bivariate  probit selection
models  with incomplete  classification.
l3.Nevertheless,  Fishe  et.al.  (1981)  show  that  if ous,r  differs  from  zero,  substituting  )r  for Mt,ur  and  Mr,t
in the second  stage  OLS regression  yields biased  estinates.
l4.Estimates of o, and the correct asymptotic  covariance  matrix were obtained  based  on the tfuee-cell
asymptotic  covariance  formula developed  by Tunali (1986, pa;ge  278). Note also, that if expressions  (1)
and  (2) are  identical,  d1  :  o1-1,  dlor:  a, and  ou,- :  or,*/c"  These  restrictions  are  tested  later  in the
paper  using estimates  from the bivariate probit and  OIJ  models.
l5.Expression  (8) is  based  implicitly  on  the  assumption  that  expressions  (l) and  (2)  are  identical,  in which
case  u, equals  erlo, and,  a = dlor
16.We  also  estimated  the entire model  excluding  type (i) households  on the possibility that some  of these
families may have misunderstood  the survey questions.  The qualitative and (in  most cases) the
quantitative  nature  of our results  were not sensitive  to whether  type (i) families were included. Selected
results  from that  analysis  are  provided  in Duca  and  Rosenthal  (i991).
l?.The asset  data taken from the SCF include  the principal financial assets  that households  might hold
other than pension  wealth, plus the current market value of residential  property and autos. Note elso,
that information on debts  is based  on book as opposed  to rnarket  value,  See  Avery, Elliehausen,  and
Kennickell (198?) for further details on these  data.
lS.Borrowing  to  finance nondurable consumption  immediatd  lowers net wealth which  implies a
simultaneous  relationship between  wealth and debt.  Also, the observed  level of  wealth in  1983 is
potentially sensitive  to whether  the family was credit constrained  over the 1980  to 1983  period-
l9.These  included  financing  for jewelry, fur coats,  boats,  snowmobiles,  and  other  hobby  equipment.
2O.Owning  a mobile home  was  not treated  as  homeownership  given  the low quality of mobile home  loars.
Note,  also,  that  OWNHSTand  SOMHST  (defined  below)  are  based  on pre-1980  activity  to control  for
possible  simultaneity  with the  probability  of being  turned  down  for credit  over 198G83  period.
2l.The only exception  is the  location  and  characteristics  of the  household's  neighborhood  which could
porenrially  affect access  to mortgage  credit given that neighborhood  qaltty  and stability affect housi S
prices. However,  the 1983  SCF does  not include  information  on the family's neighborhood  which
precludes  analysis  of that  question.
22.Because  the Dbto equation  is estimated  to control for selection  effects  when evaluating  the demand
for debt, results  from the Dbt0 equation  are presented  in Appendix C.
23.Although  Jappelli  (1990)  and  Cox and  Jappelli  (forthcoming)  also  evaluate  the  probability that a family
is credit constrained  using the 1983  SCF, as discussed  at the outset,  we include a number of important
variables  that have not previously been analyzed. These  variables include tlNEl"F, PENINC,  AvBRsE,
coNslrMp,  Ltx,  D[JR,  EMERG,  cuREMP,  BADHsr,  owNHIsr,  soMIIsr, cIIEcK, alld WEIFARE.  Also, whereas
Cox and  Jappelli (forthcoming) include  a measure  of permanent  income, we stress  the role of household
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wealth  for reasons  described  earlier.  On a more  methodological  note,  Jappelli  (1990)  includes  the actual
levels of household  net weaJth  and the log of debt in his model without addressing  the simultarnity
between net wealth, debt, and the propensity to be credit constrained,  and without accounting for
households  that hold zero debt.  Similarly, although  Cox and Jappelli (forthcoming) analyze  the effect
of credit cor$traints on household  debt using a methodology  similar to here, they set  the covariance  of
the error terms from the two selection  equations  equal  to zero.  As described  eadier, such restrictions
can bias estimates  from censored  discrete  choice  models  and second  stage  linear regressioru  [e.g. Fishe
et. al. (1981) and Maddala  (1983)1. On the other hand, if  our estirnate  that ou1.,a  is small and
irsignificant carries  over to other samples,  then conelation between  the zero debt and eredit constraint
selection  equations  may be less  of a concem.
24.These  results  are consistent  with ernpirical  fmdings by Boyes,  Hofftnan and Low (1989) and Orgler
(1970) which indicate that the acceptance/rejection  of loan applications  and consumer  loan defaults are
significantly correlated  with creditworthiness  variables  similar to those  above.
25.This result is in contrast  to that of Jappelli (1990)  who found signilicant evidence  that higher income
and  more wealthy  households  were  less  likely to be credit  constrained.  However,  the  differences  between
our results  and those  of Jappelli (1990)  may reflect differences  in specification  as  noted earliel.
26.This  interpretation  is consistent  with Boyes,  Hofftnan,  and  Low (1989)  who find that  marriage  has
a negative  and significant effect on the probability that a borrowet defaults  on a consumer  loan.  Note,
also, that MALE  has a small and insignificant coefficient in the credit constraint  model, but a positive
and signficant coefficient in the unadjusted  OLS demand  function.  That result suggests  that male loan
applicants  may face  less  restrictive  debt ceilings  than  female  borrowers. However, such  findings should
be viewed with  caution given that the significance  of the coefficient on MALE  is not robust to the
alternative  specifications  of the debt function presented  in Tables  II and III'
27.The  bivariate  probit model failed to converge  when  WHat and  the credit variables  were omitted from
the credit constraint equation.  For that reason  Model II in Table II  reports results  from a univariate
probit model using only families that prefer to hold positive debt (DbtO :  1), the group over which the
credit constraint  variable (Cr) is defined. To the extent  that rur.,?  is close  to zero,  as  suggested  by results
in Model I,  then specification  errors resulting from the use of a simple probit model in Model II are
likely to be slight.
28.These  findings  are  consistent  with recent  studies  by Gabriel  and  Rosenthal  (1991)  and  Canner,  Gabriel
and  Woolley  (1991). Those  studies  evaluate  borrower  choice  of FHA versus  conventional  mortgages,
recognizing that FHA  loans are more expensive  than conventional loans but have less restrictive
downpayment  requirements.  Findings  indicate  that  nonwhite  homeowners  are  more likely to receive  FHA
mortgages  than comparable  white households.
29.Note that if  the log-normal model is the "correct" specification for  the demand function, then
expressions  (1) ard (2) must differ since  the log of zero debt is not defined. In contrast, if  the linear
model is the correct specification  and if expressions  (1) and (2) are identical, then o, =  o1.o1'  o11,g2  =
or.*lar, tnd a :  dlor  ln column  (l) of Tables  II and  III, observe  that  or is close  to dr,ur  and  both  o"',t
and o,,r  are small and insignificant.  However, a Wald test rejects  the null that @  =  d/or,'r [the test
statisric equaled  97.2 and  is distributed J(16)1.  To form the Wald statistic, we took d and or.o1  from
column (1) of Table III, a from column (l)  of Table II, and  formed the variance  matrix for d/or-t  based
on the Delta method [see  Billingsley (1979) for a discussion  of the Delta method].
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30.For the linear model we also altemately  dropped  M1,.1  and Mr,u2  to determine  whether  collinearity
between  the two terms might account  for their low t-ratios. In both cases  the included  selection  term was
not signific&nt. Similarly, the log-linear model was also estimated  including both selection  terms, and
again  with only M,,o, included; in both cases  M,,u, was not significant.
3l.In  addition, note that column (1) of Table IV presents  results from a Tobit debt demard function
estimated  over families that are not credit constrained. In contrast  to the selection  model in column (l)
of Table III,  the tobit model restricts the debt demand  function and the process  goveming whether
families prefer to hold zero  debt [expressions  (l)  and  (2)] to be alike.  Nevertheless,  a Wald test fails to
reject the null that coefficient estirnates  from the two models  are equal  (the test statistic equals  4.4 and
has  a )e(16) distribution).
32.The  test  statistic  was  constructed  by forming  T :  - 2'[C131.90  +  46.29)  - 125.16l:  79.1, where
T has a Chi-Square  distribution with  16 degrees  of freedom, the number of restrictions between  the
stratified and full sample  models.
33.Formulae  used  to predict the impact  of borrowing constraints  for each  of the models  in Tables  III and
IV are provided in Appendix A.
34.The estimated  impact of borrowing constraints  based  on the log-linear model exceeds  $300,000 for
roughly 10 percent  of constrained  households  in the sample.
35.These  results  are  consistent  with findings by Rosenthal  and  Duca  (1991)  (obtained  using  the same  data
as here) which suggest  that borrowing constraints  significantly lower homeownership  rates.
36.That result also holds for the different simulated  credit histories  (good and  bad) in Table VI.
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TTBI.E  II
The  Likelihood  of  Not  Being
I'PDEL  I
Variable  coeff.  ?-ratio
credit  corrstrained*
I{ODEL  II








































































f  is  estimated  based  on  the  bj-variate  problt  likelihood  functj-on  in
expression  (6).  For  the  more  parsimonious  specification  irr  Model  II  a  simple
ulivariate  probit  model  was  used  becauBe  tshe  bivariate  probit  model  would  not
converge.  Both  models  are  estimated  only  over  households  that  prefer  to  hold
positive  debt  (Dbto  =  r),  the  group  over  whi.ch  the  credit  constraint  variable  is
defined.
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TABI,B  II
Median  and  Mean  Impacts  of  Borroq'ing  Constraj-ngs
In  1OO.O0O  Dol].ar  Unit6  (1982 dollars)
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TABI,E  VI
The  Effect  of  Race  and  credic  HisEory
on  ttre  Proportion  of  Credit  Constrained  Households-
Actua]-  credit  Eistory  Good  credit  Eistory  Bad  credit  Eistory
and  Simrlated  Race  and  siuu]-ated  Race  ard  sieulated  Race
white  -Nonwhite  white  Nonwhite  Iihite  x:t!*ri'te
Actual
saq)Le
whiEe  -2725  .3610  .  L424  .2199  .5476  .6386
(n=1002  )
Nonwhite  .3748  -4640  .1?31-  .2543  .577L  .6493
(t=222)
*N,..b"rs 
in  bold  are  the  actual  frequencies  of  credit  constrained  families.
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) 27
APPENDD( A
Selection  Variables  and  Predicting  the knpact of
Borrowinq Constraints  on Household  Debt
As noted  in the text, given the assumption  that [e,, u,, ur] are distributed  trivariate normal with
zero me:u$ and  variance  matrix V, the conditional  expectation  of er given that a household  is not credit
constrained  (Cr:i)  and  holds  positive  debt  (Dbto:1)  can  be  written  as,
E[e, I u, >  - xa,U>  - z7l :  o,.u,M,,u,  *  dr,uaMr,u:,
while the conditional  expectation  of D* is,
EfDlx,z;d,a,g;t,  )  -xd, uz >  -z8l :  xd *  q..,M,."1  *  o,,rM,.r.
(A.1)
(4.2)
Based  on work by Rosenbaum  (1961),  Fishe  et al (1981),  and  Maddala  (1983),  for h  :  - xa and  b  :
- zg, Mr.,r and  Mr.,,?  can  be  written  as,
M,,"r  :  (l-of1,j-r'[P,, - or,"zP"r],




P,,  :  { I ?, J ?, u,  g(u,,u)  du,dur}icckr,-k), (A.s)
P, = { J [, J ff2u,g(u,,u)aqau,]lc1-t,,-g, (A.6)
and g  and G  are the  standard bivariate normal density and distribution functions, respectively.
Expressions  (4.5) and  (A.6) can  be simplified  as,
P",  :  fuG,Xr-rft)l  + o",.lk)t1-F(k;)1  )/G(-kr,-kJ,
n  = {nqtr-rft)l  + o.,,lk)t1-F(k)l}/G(-k,,-k),
ki  :  G, - o.1.,,2k)i(1-{,1.,,r),






This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) 28
and  /  and F are the unit normal density  and distribution  functions,  respectively. Observe  tlrat M1,,1  and
Mr,,  depend  on the parameters  a, 3, and  o.,,", which can  be estirnated  based  on bivariate  probit methods
as described  in the text.
When households  arc credit constrained  mr,or  and  m,,* can  be obtained  based  on a methodology
similar to that above. If we impose  the restriction that expressiors  (1) and (2) in the text are alike, ut
)  D.lo, - xa, where  D" is the level of debt actually  held by the household  (as  described  in the tex$, and
tt,  I  - zgJ  To form m',ur ard mr,,o,  kr is redefined  as D./o, - xa, while kr is defined as zg; these
expressions  are  then  substituted  into the formulae  above. In addition,  because  the direction of integration
for u, has  been  reversed  (u, is less  than -zg instead  of greater  than -zg), (A.7) and (A.8) are written as,
p,,  :  {fir,)t  r-rc)l  - o",.lk)tr-F(kil  }/c(-k,,-kJ,
p,c  = {-flk  tl-F(k,)l  + o,,..2(k,)t1-F(ktl}lc1-n,,-t1,
(A.1r)
(A.12)
where  a negative  sign now appears  beforefik).
When calculating impacts  based  on the Tobit model in Table IV,  expression  (A.2)  simplifies
considerably  since o,,u2  is set  equal  to zero and  we impose  the assumption  that (1) and (2) are identical.
In that  case,  (A.2) becomes,
E[Dlx;d;e,/o,  )  k,/o,] :  xd + or(k)/t1-F(kJl. (A.13)
where  k, :  D"lat - xdlo1. Expression  (A.13)  was  also  used  to calculate  impacts  associated  with the  OLS
model in Table III.
rlf  expressions  (1) and (2) differ,  in principle it  would be desireable  to control for  three forrns of
truncation  when forming m,,ur  and  m1-,; er )  D" - xd, u, )> - xa, and  u, <  - zg.  As an altemative, the
procedure  described  above  implicitly sets  -xd equal  to negative  infinity (when forming m,-1 and m',r).
This elirninates  one form of truncation  by imposing  the assunption  that u, )  D"/o1  - xa instead  of ur )
- xa.  To the extent that expressions  (1) and (2) in the text are similar, errors associated  with  this
approach  are unlikely to affect tlle qualitative nature  of our ftndings.
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APPENDIX B
Variable Definitions
Cr equals  I if not credit constrained  and  0 otherwise.
Db$  equals  1 if the family holds  debt  and  0 if the family has  zero  debt.
D equals  total household  debts  (book value) in 1982  dollars  (in 100,000  dollar units).
WIIat equals  the  fitted value  from the Wealth  regression  (in Appendix  C) in 1982  dollars  (in lff),000 dollar
units).
INC82 equals  total household  income  in 1982  dollars (in 100,000  dollar units).
tjNEMP  equals  the 1982  Unemployment  rate  of the household  head's  profession.
ED equals  1 if the household  head  has  a highschool  degree  or more.
MALE  equals  1 if the household  head  is male.
RACE equals  1 if the household  head  is nonwhite.
MARR equals  I if married.
HSIZE equals  the number  of people  in the household.
PENINC equals  INC82 multiplied by a dummy  variable  @EN),  where  PEN equal  I if either  the  household
head  or spouse  expect  to receive  pension  income  upon  retirement.
AYERSE equals  1 if the household  was  not willing to take  on any risk in investing  family savings.
CONSUMP equals  I if the household  head  felt it was 'all right for someone  like [the  respordent]  to borrow
money  to finance  a vacation.  "
L(IX  equals  I if the  household  head  felt it was 'all right for someone  like [the  respondent]  to borrow money
to fnance the purchase  of a fur coat, boat, or other luxury items.'
DIJR equals  I if the  household  head  felt it was 'all right for someone  like [the  respondenq  to borrow money
to finance  the purchase  of furniture or a car.'
EMERG equals  I if the household  head  felt it was 'all right for someone  like [the respondent]  to borrow
money  to firunce medical  experuies  or to fmance  living expenses  when income  is cut."
CTJREMP  equals  rhe number  of years  working at current  employer.
BADIIST equals  I if the household  had  problems  making  loan  payments  in the last three  years.
OWNHST equals  1 if the household  bought  a home  prior to 1980.
SOMIIST equals  I if the household  has  a nonmortgage  loan  outstanding  that was  originated  prior to 1980.
WELFARE, equals  1 if the household  received  public assistance  in 1982.
CIIECK  equals  I if the household  has  a checking  account.
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AIPEiTTDIX  C
Net  wealEh  ordinary  Leas!  Squares  Regression*
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-.032300  -.799
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- .069304  -1.953
.331459  8.892






-.347664  -  1.  811
.71]-157  4. 006




used  in  the  neL  wealth  equation  that  are  not  included  j-n  Tables  I
through  IV  are  defined  as  follows.  ntll,ff!,lB  equals  1  if  the  household  head  is
currently  working  futltime.  EI(PINEER equals  1  if  the  household  anticipates
receiving  a  "large  inheritance.  INEBRIT  equals  1  if  the  household  has  received
a  .large"  inheritance.  FItLLffC  equals  FI'LLTTME  multiplied  by  INc82.  B,KPIllc
equals  EXPINHER multiplj-ed  by  INC82.
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TABIJE  C- II
Bivariate  Probit  of  who  Would  Li.ke  to
HoId  Positive  Debt





































Log-Lj-kelihood  -  97  4. rE
Sample Size  122  4
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